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Why some animals forgo reproduction in complex societies
Abstract
In complex societies, some animals forgo breeding and help others raise young. Although this behavior at
first seems maladaptive, evolutionary biologists have developed theory that explains when and how it can
evolve. For example, if it helps kin raise more young or if dispersing to breed elsewhere is risky, an
individual may cooperate with nearby breeders. After two decades of work on the social behavior of coral
reef fish, Peter Buston of Boston University and Marian Wong of University of Wollongong, Australia, have
shown that this behavior can unfold under a third scenario: If conflict with dominant breeders is especially
risky, then subordinates will politely wait their turn to breed, rather than risk a fight. Buston and Song
explain their experimental and observational work in this feature, and then outline how their work
influences current theory.
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Why Some Animals Forgo
Reproduction in Complex Societies
Behaviors of coral reef fishes provide strong support for some major new ideas
about the evolution of cooperation.
Peter M. Buston and Marian Y. L. Wong

C

harles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species laid the foundations for evolutionary biology and understanding of life
on Earth. Even as he was marshalling
evidence for the theory of natural selection, Darwin made a point of highlighting observations that seemed to
challenge his ideas:
I… will confine myself to one
special difficulty, which at first
appeared to me insuperable, and
actually fatal to my whole theory,
I allude to the neuters or sterile
females in insect communities: for
these neuters often differ widely in instinct and structure from
both the male and fertile females,
and yet from being sterile they
cannot propagate their kind.
In the insect societies that Darwin
was alluding to, such as ants or termites, there is a reproductive division
of labor: Some individuals forgo their
own reproduction and help others reproduce. To express Darwin’s special
difficulty in modern terms, these societies are challenging to understand
because it’s not immediately apparent
how natural selection can preserve the
genes that underlie nonbreeding and

Peter Buston is an assistant professor of behavioral
ecology and marine biology at Boston University.
His research focuses on understanding cooperation,
conflict, and negotiations in animal societies, along
with understanding larval dispersal and population
connectivity of marine fishes. Marian Wong is a
lecturer in behavioral ecology and marine biology
at the University of Wollongong in Australia. Her
research focuses on understanding social and reproductive behavior in animal societies, as well as the
application of behavior to the conservation of marine
and freshwater fishes. Buston’s address: Department of Biology, 5 Cummington Mall, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215. Email: buston@bu.edu.
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helping behaviors. Evolutionary biologists have puzzled over such cooperative behaviors ever since Darwin highlighted the challenge that they present
to the theory of natural selection.
Although the social insects present
extreme cases of sociality, social birds
and mammals exhibit similar, if less
extreme, forms of sociality. Indeed,
behavioral ecologist Paul W. Sherman
of Cornell University and others have
suggested that the difference between
social insects and social vertebrates is
only one of degree, the various forms
of sociality lying on a continuum. For
example, birds such as white-fronted
bee-eaters (Merops bullockoides) and
mammals such as naked mole rats (Heterocephalus glaber), also live in complex
societies in which some individuals
forgo reproduction and help others to
reproduce, at least at some point in their
lives. Anthropologist Sarah B. Hrdy of
University of California, Davis, and others have even argued that such cooperative breeding may have been pivotal in
human evolution—essential to support
our long and unusual life histories.
Social vertebrates have proven invaluable for developing and testing
theories of social evolution—they often exhibit a high level of flexibility
in behavior, which enables researchers to manipulate key variables and
measure individual responses. In the
1980s, Stephen T. Emlen of Cornell
University presented an evolutionary
framework for understanding nonbreeding and helping strategies, based
on studies of cooperatively breeding
birds and mammals (see the sidebar “An
Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative
Behavior” on page 293). This framework
still guides much of today’s research.
Emlen emphasized that, to understand
cooperative breeding, there are two

main questions to answer: First, why
do individuals help; second, why don’t
individuals disperse to breed elsewhere? The first question focuses on
the reproductive payoff that individuals accrue from their current actions,
whereas the second focuses on the payoff associated with alternative actions.
This framework focused attention on
two major reasons that nonbreeding
and helping behaviors would evolve:
kin selection and ecological constraints.
Complex Societies of Coral Reef Fish
Because this evolutionary framework
for understanding cooperative breeding was developed based on studies
of birds and mammals, it was unclear
whether it extended more broadly to
other groups of animals. To find out,
we have spent the better part of two decades studying the complex societies of
two coral reef fishes: the clown anemonefish (Amphiprion percula), in Madang
Lagoon, Papua New Guinea, and the
emerald goby (Paragobiodon xanthosomus), at Lizard Island, Australia.
The societies of these fishes bear a
striking resemblance to the complex
societies of birds and mammals. In
both species, groups of individuals
are found in close association with invertebrate hosts (anemones or corals)
that provide the fish with protection
from predators. Each host contains one
group of fish, which is composed of a
breeding pair and a small number of
nonbreeders. Within each group there
is a size-based dominance hierarchy:
The breeders are the largest individuals, and the nonbreeders get progressively smaller. These fishes, like many
coral reef fishes, are hermaphroditic:
Clown anemonefish can change sex
from male to female; emerald gobies
can change sex from female to male.
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The aim of our work has been to
use these fishes to test the robustness
of the current framework for understanding the evolution of cooperative
breeding and generate new insights
into social evolution. Here, based on
our work and that of others, we present a simple but expanded evolutionary framework that captures two other
major reasons that nonbreeding and
helping behaviors would evolve.

© 2001, Norbert Wu/Pacific Stock, Inc.

Kin Selection in Birds and Mammals
The theory of kin selection, formalized
by the evolutionary biologist William
D. Hamilton in the 1960s, emphasizes that there are two ways for individuals to pass their genes to the next
generation—either directly, by producing their own offspring, or indirectly,
by enhancing the offspring production
of their relatives. Helping relatives can
be favored by kin selection because the
relatives’ offspring share copies of the
helper’s genes. This hypothesis makes
two critical predictions: First, helpers
enhance the fitness of breeders; and
second, helpers are closely related to
breeders.
In the late 1980s, studies of whitefronted bee-eaters, a colonially nesting
bird found in Kenya and Tanzania, provided support for both of these predictions: Each additional helper results in
the breeders raising, on average, half
a chick more to fledging, and helpers
tend to be the offspring of the breeders
they help. There is now a large body of
evidence showing that helpers enhance
the fitness of close kin and, consequently, that kin selection helps to explain
many of the cases of helping behavior
observed in social birds and mammals.
Ecological Constraints in Vertebrates
The theory of ecological constraints,
formalized by Emlen, emphasizes that
two alternative options are available to
individuals—either they can disperse
to breed elsewhere or they can stay on
their natal territory as nonbreeders and
help rear siblings. Many factors can be
encompassed by the umbrella term ecological constraints: Staying can be favored
if the habitat is saturated, meaning there
are no high-quality habitat vacancies,
Clown anemonefish live in complex societies, in which a small number of individuals
forgo breeding. Groups are found in close
association with sea anemones. The evolution of nonbreeding behavior has intrigued
biologists since the advent of the theory of
natural selection.
www.americanscientist.org
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Social groups of white-fronted bee-eaters (left) and naked mole rats (right) include members
that for a period do not breed but instead help group-mates raise young. Research on these
birds and mammals, as well as others, has established that the evolution of these behaviors is
influenced by kin selection and ecological constraints.

or because it is dangerous to move between patches of suitable habitat. This
hypothesis makes three predictions:
First, individuals will stay as nonbreeders when there is some ecological constraint; second, critically, the likelihood
of individuals dispersing to breed elsewhere will increase when the ecological
constraint is relaxed; and, third, competition for breeding positions will be
intense when habitat vacancies arise.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
studies of naked mole rats, a subterranean rodent found in Ethiopia, Somalia,
and Kenya, provided observational support for the first and third predictions:
Unpredictable food availability (large
plant tubers) and hard arid soils reduce the reproductive payoff associated

with dispersing, and competition for
breeding vacancies following the death
of a breeder is intense and sometimes
bloody. Subsequent studies have yielded considerable observational and experimental evidence for all three predictions, demonstrating that ecological
constraints help explain many cases of
nonbreeding. In birds and mammals,
nonbreeding and helping behaviors often go hand in hand, because when an
individual’s independent breeding options are poor it can stay home and help
its relatives reproduce.
Kin Selection in Coral Reef Fishes
Guided by the evolutionary framework, we began by investigating
whether clownfish nonbreeders might

forgo their own reproduction and help
the breeders reproduce, thereby gaining indirect genetic benefits.
To test the predictions of this hypothesis, we spent a year in Papua
New Guinea, scuba diving every day,
monitoring survival and reproduction
in 71 groups of clownfish on two reefs.
(This was as amazing as it sounds, but
bouts of malaria and strange fungal
infections mean that the experience is
not for the faint-hearted). We complemented this monitoring with an experiment in which we removed all nonbreeders from 14 of the 71 groups and
examined the effect of the removal on
the fitness of breeders (see the schematic
on the opposite page).
After another couple of years spent
compiling the data and conducting statistical analyses, we were faced with
an intriguing result: The nonbreeders
had no effect on the survival or reproduction of breeders. Further, genetic

female

female
male

female

m

male

male

nonbreeders
nonbreeders

nonbre
nonbreeders

Complex fish societies provide a new set
of models for studying decision making in
social animals. In the coral dwelling goby,
such as the one pictured above, the male and
female are similar in size and the nonbreeders get progressively smaller (right). In clown
anemonefish, the female is largest, the male
is second largest, and the nonbreeders are
progressively smaller (far right). Photograph
courtesy of João Paulo Krajewski.
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analyses showed that the nonbreeders
were not closely related to the breeders,
because they disperse from their natal
territories as larvae very early in life.
Taken together these null results indicated something quite remarkable: Kin
selection, one of the founding concepts
of social evolution, would play no role
in explaining these fishy societies.
Future Selection in Coral Reef Fishes
If nonbreeders are not gaining indirect
genetic benefits, then they must be contributing genetically to the next generation in some other way—otherwise
their behavior would be weeded out by
natural selection. In the late 1970s and
early 1980s, based on their studies of
the Florida scrub jay, the ornithologists
Glen E. Woolfenden and John W. Fitzpatrick emphasized the possibility that
nonbreeders might accrue direct benefits in the future, by inheriting the territory following the death of the breeders.
The idea can be formalized in a manner
directly analogous to kin selection (see
the sidebar “A Modified Framework for Cooperative Behavior” on page 295).
To determine whether the behavior of clownfish was favored by future
selection, we tested two critical predictions: First, the largest nonbreeder
from an anemone would inherit the
territory when a dominant breeder
died and left a breeding vacancy;
and second, these breeding vacancies
would not be usurped either by smaller nonbreeders from the anemone or
by nonbreeders from elsewhere.
We tested these predictions by monitoring 57 of the 71 groups and recording which individuals from the population filled breeding vacancies when
they arose. We complemented these observations with an experiment in which
we removed breeding males from 16
groups on a third reef, and determined
which individual from the 26 groups on
that reef filled the breeding vacancy created (see the schematic on page 294).
The results were unambiguous: In all
cases the largest nonbreeder from the
anemone inherited the breeding vacancy; in no case did the smaller individual
from the anemone, or a nonbreeder
from elsewhere, usurp the vacancy.
Simply put, individuals form a perfect
queue for breeding positions. These results are one of the clearest demonstrations (not confounded by kin selection)
that individuals will adopt nonbreeding
positions solely because of the potential
for reproductive success in the future.
www.americanscientist.org

An Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative Behavior
The evolution of cooperative behavior depends on the costs and benefits
of cooperative and alternative actions for the donor and its relatives: Cooperative behavior can be favored because of its beneficial effects on kin
(called kin selection), and cooperative behavior can be favored because of
the detrimental effects associated with alternative actions (called ecological
constraints). The behavior favored by selection can be determined using the
equation called Hamilton’s rule. In particular, the cooperative action i will be
favored over the alternative action j if
Xi + ri Yi > Xj + rj Yj
where Xi (or Xj) is the number of offspring associated with donor’s ith (or
jth) action, Yi (or Yj) is the recipient’s number of offspring, and r is the probability that the two individuals share a copy of a particular gene identical
by descent. The r terms capture the effect of kin selection; the j terms capture the effect of ecological constraints. Hamilton’s theory of kin selection
showed how altruism might evolve in groups of close kin and provided a
solution to Darwin’s problem.
Ecological Constraints in Fishes
The benefits that nonbreeders gain
from inheriting territories in the future are necessary but not sufficient
to explain their behavior. A complete
understanding requires that we also
explain why nonbreeders don’t disperse to breed elsewhere.
To determine whether their behavior was favored because of ecological
constraints we tested two critical predictions: First, the likelihood of dispersal would increase as the availability

of suitable habitat increased; second,
the likelihood of dispersal would decrease as the risks of movement increased. We tested whether dispersal
occurred when habitat became available by monitoring the 97 groups of
clownfish, after removing males or
nonbreeders from 30 of them to create habitat vacancies. The manipulated
groups could be as little as one meter
or as much as 100 meters from their
neighbors. In clownfish, no individuals dispersed between anemones even

female

female

male

male

×
nonbreeders

×

nonbreeders

before manipulation

after manipulation

Experimental removal of nonbreeders does not reduce the number of eggs hatched by the
breeding pair, and groups are not composed of close relatives, demonstrating that kin selection does not explain cooperative behavior in social groups of clownfish.
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reef fishes, however, it is nonbreeding
and queuing that tend to go hand in
hand (rather than nonbreeding and
helping), because when an individual’s independent breeding options are
poor its only way to reproduce is to
settle in a territory as a nonbreeder
and wait to inherit a breeding position.

non breeders
nonbreeders

when habitat saturation was reduced
in this manner.
More compellingly, we complemented this with an experiment using emerald gobies, in which we manipulated
habitat saturation and risks of movement using 31 pairs of coral habitats (see
the schematic below). To move between
corals, gobies must risk being eaten,
and that risk increases with distance
between corals. In emerald gobies, the
likelihood of dispersal increased as the
availability of suitable habitat increased,

To understand the benefits of staying in a
group as a nonbreeder, we removed the male
from groups of clown anemonefish to observe
which nonbreeders filled the vacancy. In all
cases, the largest resident nonbreeder filled it
and successfully bred, demonstrating the benefit of queuing to inherit a breeding position.
Coral-dwelling gobies exhibit nearly identical
patterns of territory inheritance.

whereas it decreased as risks of movement increased. Indeed, in these fish,
the probability of nonbreeders moving
between experimental corals is effectively zero when they are just one meter
apart, and corals are much further apart
than this in nature.
Taken together, these results indicate that ecological constraints play
an important role in the evolution of
nonbreeding in coral reef fishes, just as
they do in the evolution of nonbreeding in birds and mammals. In coral

Social Constraints in Coral Reef Fish
Future benefits and ecological constraints are sufficient to explain why
individuals wait to inherit a breeding
position rather than disperse to breed
elsewhere. However, they do not provide the answer to another perplexing
question: Why do individuals wait to
inherit a breeding position rather than
contest for a breeding position? One
possibility is that individuals don’t
contest for breeding positions because
of social constraints (a concept directly
analogous to the concept of ecological
constraints), which might lower the
reproductive payoff associated with

×
× × ×
×
× ×
×

×
× × ×
×
× ×
×

low saturation

low saturation

low saturation

low saturation

×
× ×
×

×
× ×
×

high saturation
high saturation
To tease apart the costs of leaving a social group in coral-dwelling
gobies, we manipulated distance between groups and numbers of
nonbreeders. Longer distances between habitats posed a larger risk of
predation during dispersal, and larger groups of nonbreeders posed a
higher level of habitat saturation. The proportion of subordinates that
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high saturation
high saturation
disperse is highest (about 30 percent of nonbreeders) when distance and
saturation is low, but we also observed some dispersal (about 15 percent
of nonbreeders) when the distance was low but the habitat saturation
was high. However, when the distance between habitats was larger (100
centimeters), almost none of the nonbreeders chose to disperse.

© 2014 Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society. Reproduction
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In the clown anemonefish, the observed distribution of size ratios of individuals adjacent
in rank (purple bars) is different from the distribution of size ratios expected under a null
model (yellow bars). In particular, there is a
lack of cases where individuals are similar in
size (ratio of about 1.0) and an overabundance
of cases where the dominant is about 25 percent larger than its subordinate (ratio of about
0.8). In the clown anemonefish, this pattern
is maintained because subordinates regulate
their growth when they approach the size of
the dominant fish. (Figure adapted from P. M.
Buston and M. A. Cant, Oecologia 149:362.)
www.americanscientist.org

A Modified Framework for Cooperative Behavior
In the absence of kin selection, the evolution of cooperative behavior depends on current and future costs and benefits of cooperative or alternative
actions: Selection may favor cooperative behavior because of its beneficial
effects in the future (called future selection) or because of ecological constraints. The behavior favored by selection can be determined by an equation that we call the future rule. In particular, the cooperative action i will be
favored over the alternative action j if
Xi + fi Zi > Xj + fj Zj
where Xi (or Xj) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s
ith (or jth) action, Zi (or Zj) is number of offspring associated with the individual’s ith (or jth) action in the future, and f is the probability that those
benefits will be realized. The f terms capture the effect of future selection;
the j terms capture the effect of ecological constraints. The concept of future
selection reveals why nonbreeding and helping behaviors might evolve in
groups in the absence of kin selection.
we don’t understand exactly how the
subordinates regulate their growth,
although it seems to involve a selfimposed reduction in food intake that
one might call dieting or fasting, at
least in the emerald gobies. The extent
to which social birds and mammals

adaptively modify their food intake,
growth, and size in response to social
context is unknown, although interesting patterns have been documented in
mole rats, meerkats, and humans.
Putting the observations of eviction
and well-defined size ratios together,

0.22
0.20

distribution of size ratios
expected

0.18

actual

0.16

relative frequency

alternative actions within the group
(see the sidebar “A New Evolutionary
Framework for Cooperative Behavior” on
page 297).
An example of a social constraint
would be the potential for inbreeding,
emphasized by the behavioral ecologists Walter A. Koenig and Frank A.
Pitelka, both then at University of California, Berkeley, based on their studies
of acorn woodpeckers (Melanerpes formicivorus), which live in family groups.
If the only breeding positions that can
be obtained by contesting would involve mating with relatives, and inbreeding has a low reproductive payoff, then selection may favor waiting
to breed with a nonrelative rather than
contesting to breed with a relative. The
potential for inbreeding is just one factor that can be considered under the
umbrella term social constraints, but
there might be many types of social
constraint, just as there are many types
of ecological constraint.
To determine whether the queuing
behavior of clown anemonefish and
emerald gobies might be favored because of social constraints, we began
by thinking about what those constraints might be. During our yearlong
field study of clown anemonefish we
observed that dominant individuals
occasionally evicted their immediate
subordinates when the size difference between the two individuals was
small. Further, we found that the size
ratios between individuals adjacent in
rank were not random. Rather, welldefined size ratios occurred between
individuals adjacent in rank, and these
size ratios seemed to be maintained by
subordinates regulating their growth
(see graph at right).
The idea that a vertebrate could
regulate its growth in response to social context was flabbergasting and
took (and still takes) many researchers in the field by surprise. Even now,
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Taken together, these results are one
of the clearest demonstrations that individuals will adopt nonbreeding strategies within a group because of a social
constraint—in this case, the hidden
threat of eviction. Since we published
our findings, zoologists Tzo Zen Ang
and Andrea Manica, both at University
of Cambridge at the time, have reported similar results in other coral reef fish
societies. The role of social constraints
in animal cooperation, particularly the
role of hidden threats, is now an active
and exciting area of research.

subordinate evicts a dominant
dominant evicts a subordinate

frequency of evictions (percent)
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0
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0.95

1.00

body size ratio
By conducting contest experiments between pairs of nonbreeding coral-dwelling gobies, we
found that the frequency of eviction of one fish increases as the body size ratio between the two
individuals approaches 1.0. Subordinates have a slight chance of evicting their dominants (purple
bars) when they are similar in size, but no chance of doing so when they are dissimilar in size.
Dominants are more than twice as likely to evict their subordinates when they are similar in size
than when they are dissimilar in size. Thus, eviction is a credible threat that enforces peaceful
cooperation, via the subordinate’s regulation of their growth in body size. (Figure adapted from
M. Y. L. Wong, et al., Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B 274:1093.)

we formed three complementary hypotheses. First, selection would favor
dominant individuals that evicted
rather than tolerated subordinates who
became too close in size—otherwise
the dominant would risk being overthrown. Second, because of the threat
of eviction, selection would favor subordinate individuals that regulate their
growth and size. Third, because of the
size differences maintained, selection
would favor subordinate individuals
that wait to inherit rather than contest
for a breeding position.
To determine whether the social
constraint existed and whether the
observed subordinate behavior was
favored because of it, we used emerald gobies to test a critical prediction of each of these hypotheses: First,
the likelihood of dominants evicting
subordinates would increase as they
became more similar in size; second,
subordinates would maintain a size
difference with respect to their immediate dominant that did not elicit eviction; and third, the likelihood of a subordinate ascending in rank by queuing
would be greater than the likelihood of
ascending in rank by contesting.
We tested these predictions by staging 56 contests between pairs of non296
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breeders. Pairs of contestants were chosen such that they fell into one of four
categories (size ratio ≈ 0.85; size ratio ≈
0.90; size ratio ≈ 0.95; size ratio ≈ 1.0),
where the size ratio is given by the size
of the smaller individual (the subordinate) divided by the size of the larger
individual (the dominant). The paired
contestants were released into a coral
in which neither had prior residence.
The outcome of each staged contest
was scored as subordinate evicted,
dominant evicted, or neither evicted.
In support of the first prediction,
we found that dominants were more
likely to evict their subordinates as
the size ratio of the contestants tended
toward 1.0. In support of the second
prediction, we found that the probability of subordinate eviction was
minimized when the pair’s size ratio
matched that which is maintained under natural conditions (0.93). Finally,
given the size ratio maintained under
natural conditions, the probability of
a subordinate ascending in rank by
winning a contest is effectively zero,
whereas the probability of ascending
in rank by outliving at least one of its
dominants is at least 0.66, assuming
mortality rates are independent of
rank (see the graph above).

A New Evolutionary Framework
Darwin highlighted the challenge that
the nonbreeding and helping behaviors observed in insect societies presented for his theory of natural selection and, since then, generations of
biologists have set about rigorously
testing alternative hypotheses for why
such cooperative behaviors might be
favored by natural selection.
From the mid-1960s through the
mid-1990s, behavioral ecologists developed a framework for understanding the evolution of nonbreeding and
helping behavior. That framework emphasized that individuals might cooperate because their behavior provides
indirect genetic benefits, and that individuals might not pursue alternative, noncooperative options outside
of the group because of ecological
constraints. That framework emerged
from studies of cooperatively breeding birds and mammals, leaving us to
wonder how things would play out in
other parts of the animal kingdom.
Our goal has been to test the generality of this evolutionary framework
and to generate new insights by studying complex societies of coral reef
fishes. Our studies, along with those
of many others, have enabled us to expand this framework. This framework
emphasizes that individuals might
cooperate because their behavior provides future genetic benefits, and that
individuals might not pursue alternative, noncooperative options inside the
group because of social constraints (see
the sidebar “A New Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative Behavior” on the opposite page).
For natural selection to favor the evolution of cooperative behavior via kin
selection or future selection, individuals
must be able to assess or enhance the
probability of accruing the benefits of
cooperation. This statement does not

© 2014 Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society. Reproduction
with permission only. Contact perms@amsci.org.

A New Evolutionary Framework for Cooperative Behavior
Selection may favor cooperative behavior because of kin selection or future selection; such behavior can be favored because of detrimental effects
associated with alternative actions outside of the group (the ecological
constraints) or inside the group (called social constraints). In particular, a
cooperative action i will be favored over alternative noncooperative actions
j and k if two inequalities are satisfied simultaneously:
Xi + ri Yi + fi Zi > Xj + rj Yj + fj Zj
Xi + ri Yi + fi Zi > Xk + rk Yk + fk Zk
where Xi (Xj or Xk) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s
ith (jth or kth) action in the present. Yi (Yj or Yk ) is the recipient individual’s
number of offspring associated with the donor’s actions, and r is the probability that the two individuals share a copy of a particular gene identical by descent. Zi (Zj or Zk) is the number of offspring associated with the individual’s
actions in the future and f is the probability that those benefits will be realized
in the future. The r terms capture the effect of kin selection, and the f terms
capture the effect of future selection. Likewise, the j terms capture the effect of
ecological constraints, and the k terms capture the effects of social constraints.
Taken together, the four concepts of kin selection, future selection, ecological
constraints, and social constraints provide a more complete understanding of
the diversity of cooperative strategies observed in complex animal societies.
mean that individuals have to know the
probability of sharing an allele identical by descent or the probability of an
event occurring in the future. Rather,
individuals must have a simple rule—
a kin recognition system or future recognition system—that enables them to
assess these probabilities with a reasonable degree of certainty and then act accordingly. There has been a lot of work
on kin recognition systems; work on future recognition systems is in its infancy
and is a potentially fascinating avenue
of research.
We believe that expanding the evolutionary framework to encompass
four key concepts—kin selection, future selection, ecological constraints,
and social constraints—provides a
more complete understanding of the
diversity of nonbreeding and helping
strategies observed in complex animal
societies. Also, this expanded view
reveals a path toward unification of
studies of cooperation across the biological and social sciences.
The evolutionary framework for
understanding cooperation presented
here has a striking parallel in economic bargaining theory. An excerpt from
University of Warwick economist Abhinay Muthoo’s introduction to bargaining theory helps illustrate this point:
Two main determinants of such
(marital) negotiations are each
individual’s outside and inside
www.americanscientist.org

options. Their outside options are
the payoffs that they obtain from
divorce, which might, for example, be their payoffs from being
single, or from finding an alternative partner. Their inside options
are their payoffs from remaining
married but with generally uncooperative behavior (such as constant fights and arguments…).
In our expanded evolutionary framework, the payoff associated with dispersing to breed elsewhere, which is
influenced by ecological constraints, is
directly analogous to the outside option in bargaining theory—the payoff
associated with leaving a cooperative
interaction. Similarly, the payoff associated with contesting to breed within
the group, which is influenced by social
constraints, is directly analogous to the
inside option in bargaining theory—the
payoff derived from behaving uncooperatively within an interaction.
Framed in the language of bargaining theory then, our expanded evolutionary framework becomes: Selection
will favor individuals that engage in
cooperative actions if the payoff associated with cooperation (which depends on direct, indirect, and future
genetic benefits) is greater than the
payoff associated with either the noncooperative outside option (which depends on ecological constraints) or the
noncooperative inside option (which

depends on social constraints). Although the nonbreeding and helping
behaviors observed in animal societies seem paradoxical, they make sense
when one considers the alternative options available to individuals.
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